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Abstract — In order to overcome a number of difficulties 
detected on the Brazilian electricity market this paper proposes 
and tests a bid based short-term market. To simulate the 
behavior of the hydros in this new market, it was implemented 
an Agent-Based Model - ABM using the reinforcement Q-
Learning algorithm, Simulated Annealing, and linear 
programming. In the simulations we used real data from the 
Brazilian power system encompassing more than 98% of the 
total hydro installed capacity and three years of market data. 
The results indicate that the management of (virtual) reservoirs 
can be under the responsibility of each hydro, which could save 
water according to their own risk perception, while it is 
maintained the current efficiency and security levels. Results 
also suggest that the final monthly short-term market prices can 
substantially decrease in comparison with the current prices. 
Index Terms - Agent-based simulation, Brazilian power system, 
Q-learning, Virtual reservoirs. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Several electricity market structures have evolved to 
ensure free access, guarantee fair competition, foster higher 
efficiency, and decrease price, while maintaining or improving 
reliability of operation and security of supply. Although Brazil 
made significant progresses, its electricity market has certain 
particularities that contribute to distinguish it from other 
markets. With a continental interconnected transmission 
system, a large and growing demand, and a total installed 
generation capacity around 137 GW [1], from which around 
70% comes from hydropower plants with multiple owners 
coexisting in hydro cascades, this electricity market has gone 
through two large institutional and regulatory reforms in the 
last twenty years. Currently, it contains a number of special 
processes, mechanisms and instruments that will be detailed in 
the next paragraphs. 
In Brazil, there are two bilateral contract markets: the Free 
Contracting Environment – ACL, where eligible consumers 
that fit in the characteristic of free consumers or special 
consumers can choose their supplier; and the Regulated 
Contracting Environment – ACR, designed for distribution 
companies to buy electricity on behalf of the captive 
consumers through national public auctions. The ACR 
operates as the single buyer model where companies sign 
PPAs - Power Purchase Agreements to build and operate 
power plants under long-term concessions. The maximum 
amount of energy that can be traded in the electricity markets 
is termed the physical guarantee. This is a certificate issued by 
the Ministry of Mines and Energy that corresponds to the 
maximum energy production that can be maintained almost 
continuously over the years. Thus, a power plant can sell part 
of is physical guarantee in the ACR, part in the ACL, and still 
have a fraction to be automatically settled in the short-term 
market. 
When the power plant becomes commissioned, it can 
perform a seasonal adjustment of the amounts of energy 
committed through contracts and of its physical guarantee (the 
total amount of resources to honor the signed contracts). The 
seasonal adjustment means that generation companies are 
allowed, once a year, to set the monthly amount of the annual 
contracted energy and the monthly amount of the physical 
guarantee. Herewith, regarding the commercial environments, 
there is an annual “window” to define these amounts. 
However, the physical dispatch of the power plants is carried 
out in a centralized way by the Brazilian Independent System 
Operator - ISO, which doesn’t consider the signed contracts 
when dispatching generation units. The ISO’s dispatch goal is 
to minimize the total operating cost, and this is done using a 
software package driven by a minimal cost dispatch approach 
and mainly considering future scenarios of water inflows. 
In this scheme, generators are not allowed to decide their 
own physical generation in order to comply with their 
contracts, and the ISO decides their outputs without 
considering the commercial commitments of generators. Thus, 
if they are not dispatched, they can be exposed to the risk of 
having to buy electricity at volatile short-term market prices to 
complete the energy committed in their signed contracts. 
Because of that, it was implemented a mechanism to share the 
aforementioned risk among hydros. This mechanism is known 
as MRE – Mechanism for Energy Reallocation. Shortly, the 
MRE reallocates energy, transferring the surplus generated 
from those that produce beyond their monthly allocated 
physical guarantee to those that produce below. Finally, as the 
MRE is automatically activated, there is no flexibility for 
hydros to address their exposition risk. 
The short-term market (known as MCP) takes place after 
the ISO’s dispatch. Unlike other markets, the Brazilian short-
term market is not a marketplace where generators are active 
through a self-dispatch procedure, or generators influence, 
through their bids, the dispatch schedule. Moreover, the short-
term market price (known as Price for Settlement of 
Differences or PLD for short) is not the result from the market 
participant’s interaction, but it is one of the outputs of the 
software package that is run by the ISO. The MCP is simply a 
mechanism to settle differences between the amounts of 
electricity committed by contracts and those amounts of 
electricity that each agent ends up providing/receiving.  
Having in mind these characteristics, some problems of 
this market design are recognized. The conciliation between 
the commercial commitments and the physical dispatch is not 
smooth. There is a lack of “trading opportunities” to 
encourage participants to comply with their contracts (namely 
related with the unique annual “window” of the 
seasonalization process). The Brazilian short-term market acts 
as a mechanism to settle differences rather than a true market, 
and neither the short-term price nor the dispatch schedule is 
influenced by the market. The mechanism to share the short-
term risk exposition (MRE) is automatically performed, which 
imposes a kind of “strait jacket” on the market participants. 
Finally, inconsistencies in the software package code, the 
centerpiece of this market design, may cause a huge impact on 
the sector, affecting the confidence of the market agents. 
A solution typically adopted in other electricity markets is 
the employment of a more market-oriented approach. Designs 
like that would enable generators to bid, in the short-term, 
quantities and prices, which could be used to set the market 
positions and to substitute the seasonalization process and the 
MRE. Nevertheless, there are some concerns to be faced, 
especially in a power system with a large share of hydros: 
• Efficiency of the hydro energy resources. As discussed in 
[2], it is necessary to coordinate, either through a 
centralized or decentralized dispatch, the use of the water 
in the reservoirs in order to take advantage of the all 
potential stored energy in the cascades. A decentralized 
dispatch, e.g. a bid based short-term market, can be 
essentially an instantaneous process and the inter-
temporal features of river chain operations can not be 
entirely captured. Moreover, the presence of several 
owners in the cascades, which is the case of Brazil, 
endorses a market design based on a centralized dispatch. 
• Security of supply. The Brazilian short-term market price 
(PLD) has an average value of 37.72 €/MWh, and the 
hydro average successful bid price from the national 
public auctions is 38.16 €/MWh [3]. Nevertheless, the 
PLD standard deviation is around 55.36 €/MWh, which 
imposes a huge risk to the health of the business, 
especially regarding cash flow stability. Accordingly, it 
is advocated the need to have enough incentives and a 
mechanism to ensure the security of supply. Nowadays, 
this concern is addressed both via the contracting scheme 
where the demand must be fully ex-ante contracted and 
contracts physically backed, and via the ISO dispatch, 
either through the mechanism of risk aversion 
implemented into the software package or through a 
dispatch out of the merit order authorized by CMSE, the 
federal entity that monitors the supply adequacy. 
• Flexibility to comply with contracts. The MRE was 
created because the ISO’s dispatch doesn’t consider 
contracts and hydros cannot influence it. On other hand, 
if each hydro would decide its own production, MRE 
would no longer be necessary. Nowadays, every time 
there is a water shortage, the PLD increases. So, hydros 
can be displaced by thermal stations in such a way that 
MRE will not have the extra energy to be shared. In other 
words, MRE is not able to cover the risk of generators 
having to buy electricity in the short-term market to 
complete their commitments. During long periods of 
water scarcity, this represents a significant negative 
exposed position. Unfortunately, this situation is 
happening in Brazil since 2012. This financial issue 
imposed a “regulation through litigation”, and lawsuits 
mass occurred in such a manner that the entire market 
settlement was suspended for several months. In the end 
of 2015 the legislative agenda culminated in the 
publication of a new federal law and regulatory directive 
in order to change, for all contracts signed by hydros in 
both ACR and ACL, the allocation risk between 
generators and consumers. 
In other to tackle these problems and concerns it is 
proposed a new market design aiming at enhancing the 
flexibility of market agents to comply with their commercial 
commitments while maintaining the optimized operation of 
the entire system and the security of supply in the same level. 
According to these ideas, this paper is organized as follows. 
Section II explains the proposed virtual reservoir based design, 
Section III describes the implemented ABM - Agent Based 
Model simulation, Section IV presents the results and Section 
V outlines the main conclusions. 
II. A NEW MARKET DESIGN 
Based on the concept of energy right accounts as virtual 
reservoirs, in this new design each hydro is modeled as an 
agent that has a virtual reservoir representing how much 
energy is virtually stored in his hydro plant. Hereafter, for 
each accounting period, each account is fed by the fraction of 
the total natural affluent energy that flowed to the hydro 
cascade proportional to the hydro’s physical guarantee. Then, 
the following sequence of events is adopted: 
1) The system operator continues his work as it is currently 
done (running the software dispatch package, as well as 
other procedures and schemes), and defines the amount 
of generation for each power plant. This means that it 
maintains its responsibility in terms of optimizing the use 
of the resources and keeping the security of supply of the 
country at the same level; 
2) The “remaining demand”, which is equal to the total 
demand minus the total dispatch allocated to the thermal 
power plants, is obtained for each dispatch period. This 
value is the total demand to be supplied by hydros; 
3) A bid based hydro short-term market is established for 
the remaining demand. In this market, hydros have the 
opportunity to withstand their bilateral commercial 
commitments while trying to make successful bids. The 
result of this market is a virtual dispatch with financial 
settlement purposes. To do that, each hydro agent can bid 
considering a price between zero and a ceiling price 
defined by the regulatory agency and a quantity available 
within his account; 
4) The final short-term price is calculated as a weighted 
average considering the most expensive successful hydro 
price bid and the variable cost of the last non-hydro 
resource dispatched by the ISO. 
In this new market design two worlds coexist: the real one, 
associated with the power system considering physical effects, 
and where the ISO runs the dispatch in a centralized way; and 
the virtual one, related to the settlement system and with 
commercial effects, and where hydro agents can virtually bear 
their contracts. Both worlds simultaneously operate, and the 
link between them is the real total affluent natural energy that 
flowed along the hydro cascade in each accounting period. At 
last, the settlement process will occur considering the 
successful quantity bid of each participant, and the exposed 
position will be valued by the new final short-term price.  
Further explanation about this model is provided in [5]. 
III. SIMULATION OF THE NEW MARKET 
To simulate the behavior of the hydro plants in this new 
market design, an Agent-Based Model - ABM was developed 
using reinforcement the Q-Learning algorithm, a Simulated 
Annealing (SA) mechanism, and linear programming. 
According to [6], among the modeling alternatives for bidding 
strategy analysis, ABM is highlighted because it allows 
designing complex electricity markets as collections of rule-
based agents interacting with one another dynamically and 
intelligently. An agent using Q-learning is a goal-oriented 
learner that, for a giving Markov decision process, continually 
interacts with his environment, receives feedback (rewards or 
punishments) from it, and searches for the most profitable 
action considering the past experience. In other words, at each 
time step t the agent is in some state st, chooses any action at 
that is available in state st, receives a corresponding reward rt, 
and moves to a new state st+1. Lastly, the capability of learning 
to act optimally in Markovian domains by experiencing the 
consequences of actions is given by a quality function Q(st, at). 
This function provides the expected utility of taking a given 
action in a given state, and it is given by (1). 
Q(st, at) ← Q(st, at) + α.{rt(st, at) + γ.maxaQ(st+1, a) - Q(st, at)} (1) 
The parameter α is the learning rate, which reflects the 
degree to which recently learned information will override the 
old one (α equal to 0 will make the agent not learn, while 
equal to 1 will induce the agent to consider only the most 
recent information), and the parameter γ entitles the discount 
factor that determines the importance of future reinforcements 
(γ equal to 0 will make the agent myopic by only considering 
current rewards, while values closer to 1 turn distant rewards 
more important). Additionally, the expression maxaQ(st+1, a) 
represents the best the agent thinks it can do in state st+1. In 
order to adequately balance the capacity not to converge to 
local optima and the acceleration of the learning process, a 
Simulated Annealing (SA) mechanism is included into the 
developed algorithm as detailed in [7].  
In brief, to simulate the new market design the algorithm 
gets from the ISO physical dispatch procedure the total 
demand to be supplied by non-hydros (Qnh) and by hydros 
(Qh), and the variable cost of the last non-hydro dispatched 
unit (PLDnh). It also requires information about ex-ante 
bilateral contracts (qCEt) for each account period t, i.e. the 
amount of energy that must be endured in the hydro short-term 
market by the bids. Other input data is as follows: the natural 
affluent energy that flowed in period t to the hydro cascade 
(NAEt), from which a fraction is allocated to each hydro 
giving their physical guarantee (PG); the reservoir capacity 
(RC), and the virtual reservoir level or energy right account 
(ERAt) in its initial stage. Bids can be done once respected the 
following constraints: the quantity bid (qBID) is limited by the 
ERA balance in each period t, and the price bid (pBID) is 
limited by a maximum regulatory price (pBID_uplimt). The 
bids are sorted by the price, the successful bids are then 
identified, and the ERA is finally updated. 
Agents can offer two bids. The first bid (BID1) addresses 
the need to comply with bilateral contracts. So, in BID1, 
among the possible actions, the best offer is either the exact 
amount in the bilateral contract (if ERAt ≥ qCEt) or the 
maximum available amount in order to mitigate the exposed 
position (if ERAt < qCEt). The second bid (BID2) aims at 
allowing the agents to manage their reservoirs in order to 
optimize the leftover stored energy. That is, agents would be 
allowed to get extra profit in the short-term market when there 
is more energy in the reservoir than the one required to 
comply with the bilateral ex-ante contracts. The Q-learning 
matrixes are illustrated by Table I (hatched cells represent not 
allowed actions) and Table II for BID1 and BID2. 
TABLE I.  BID1: ILLUSTRATION OF THE Q-LEARNING MATRIX 
St
at
es
 ERA > qCE s1             
ERA ≤ qCE s2             
qCE = 0 s3             
    a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8 a9 a10 a11 a12
pBID  (% of the 
pBID uplimt)  =
0   
%
100
%
100
%
75 
% 
50  
% 
25  
% 
0   
% 
100
% 
75  
% 
50   
% 
25  
% 
0   
% 
 qBID  =  0 100% . ERA 100% . qCE 
   Actions  
 
TABLE II.  BID2: ILLUSTRATION OF THE Q-LEARNING MATRIX 
St
at
es
 January s1              
… …              
December s12              
    a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 … a23 a24 a25 a26 a27
pBID  (% of the 
pBID uplimt)  =
0   
%
100
%
0  
%
25 
%
50  
% 
75  
% 
100 
% … 
0   
% 
25 
% 
50  
% 
75  
% 
100 
% 
             qBID  = 0 20% . ERAaBID1 … 100% . ERAaBID1 
   Actions  
 
Then, the reward for BID1 is calculated using equation (2) 
and for BID2 according to equation (3). 
rewardBID1t = qBID1suct - qCEt   (2) 
rewardBID2t = factorgoalt*(qBID2suct + ERAaBID2t)*PLDfinalt        (3) 
In these equations, qBID1suct and qBID2suct are the 
successful bid quantities, ERAaBID2t is the leftover energy in 
the reservoir after BID2 in period t, and the factorgoalt is the 
adjustment factor concerning the reservoir level goals. The 
value of the factorgoalt is obtained solving a linear 
programming problem aiming to avoid spillage and to 
maximize profits on the hydro short-term market. The 
decision of considering qBID2suct more important than 
ERAaBID2t (i.e. use the water stored) and vice versa (save the 
water for future usage), is guided by the factorgoalt. If the agent 
offers a large quantity of energy when qBID should be low, 
the current level of the reservoir will be away from the goal 
level (defined by the linear programming), and the reward will 
penalize the agent through the factorgoalt. 
Before running a real case, the Brazilian electricity market, 
it was developed a validation process for the entire algorithm. 
During this process, the verification of the computer program, 
written in Matlab, was performed several times, distinct values 
of the parameters used in the aforementioned Q-learning, 
Simulate Annealing and linear programming algorithms were 
tested, and several convergence criteria were verified. Finally, 
questions regarding the collective and individual rationality of 
the ABM agents were adequately addressed. 
IV. RESULTS 
A major effort was undertaken to use in the simulations 
accurate and comprehensive data from Brazil. A total of 125 
hydro power plants were simulated, which represents more 
than 98% of the total hydro installed capacity in the country. 
Besides the data about hydros, it was also used market data 
embracing 3 years, 2012, 2013 and 2014.  
For each year, the simulations considered three levels of 
ex-ante contract (95%, 50% and 0%), two types of bilateral 
contracts’ seasonalization (NAE, in which the annual amount 
is allocated bearing in mind weights determined by the water 
inflow; and FLAT, where the annual energy committed is 
monthly distributed in equal amounts), and two types of 
ceiling price rules (PLDnh, i.e. equivalent to the variable cost 
of the last non-hydro station dispatched; and Fixed, a fixed 
ceiling price equal to the annual ceiling price established by 
the national regulatory agency). This said, 12 scenarios were 
performed in each year. Each simulation takes about 12 
minutes to converge, corresponding to around 1.100 years of 
learning to reach the final results. The convergence criterion 
requires that the values of the Q-learning matrix built in a 
given iteration regarding the previous one do not change more 
than 0,5%. The learning rate α is equal to 0,9 in both BID1 
and BID2, and discount factor γ is equal to 0 in BID1 and 
equal to 1 in BID2. 
As can be seen in Tables III, IV and V, during all the years 
the annual PLD resulting from the simulation is lower (about 
60%) than the real PLD. The fourth scenario (highlighted in 
the three Tables), given its characteristic, is the most 
representative scenario of the current Brazilian market, and its 
results show that new monthly prices are about 70% lower in 
two trimesters, and 50% lower in the last trimester. 
TABLE III.  YEAR 2012: SIMULATED PLD VERSUS ACTUAL PLD 
 monthly PLD (R$/MWh) Annual PLD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ceiling 
price Seaso
qCE 
level ABM Simulation 
PLDnh
FLAT
95% 2 3 37 29 31 18 33 44 147 178 172 112 67,1 
50 2 3 37 69 68 18 52 94 110 233 240 112 86,6 
0 2 3 37 69 106 43 52 94 183 178 172 160 91,7 
NAE 
95% 2 3 11 29 31 18 33 44 74 288 240 160 77,7 
50 2 3 11 69 68 43 33 94 183 288 308 208 109,1 
0 2 3 90 69 68 68 33 119 183 288 240 256 118,3 
Fixed 
FLAT
95% 2 3 176 29 182 18 169 172 182 346 236 201 142,9 
50 2 3 176 29 182 18 169 172 327 484 367 201 177,4 
0 2 167 176 183 182 18 169 326 327 623 498 337 250,6 
NAE 
95% 2 3 11 29 31 18 13 326 471 484 236 337 163,4 
50 2 3 176 183 333 18 324 326 615 484 236 473 264,4 
0 2 3 176 183 182 172 324 326 471 623 630 337 285,6 
Actual data from the current Brazilian market 
PLDnh 18 32 117 188 181 119 91 119 183 288 376 256 163,9 
 
TABLE IV.  YEAR 2013: SIMULATED PLD VERSUS ACTUAL PLD 
 monthly PLD (R$/MWh) Annual PLD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ceiling 
price Seaso
qCE 
level ABM Simulation 
PLDnh
FLAT
95% 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 65 62 209 68 77,1 
50% 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 209 68 89,1 
0% 102 51 78 46 91 56 50 129 164 252 209 124 112,6 
NAE 
95% 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 70 115 157 209 68 89,1 
50% 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 164 157 270 124 100,5 
0% 102 51 78 46 91 56 50 100 214 204 209 180 114,9 
Fixed 
FLAT
95% 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 40 212 356 375 68 125,2 
50% 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 186 359 356 375 218 162,0 
0% 102 51 78 46 91 198 176 186 359 209 375 218 173,9 
NAE 
95% 102 51 78 46 91 56 28 186 212 209 375 68 125,1 
50% 102 51 78 46 91 56 176 186 359 356 375 68 161,9 
0% 102 51 78 46 91 56 176 186 359 209 519 218 174,1 
Actual data from the current Brazilian market 
PLDnh 412 214 340 196 345 207 117 159 263 252 331 291 260,5 
 
TABLE V.  YEAR 2014: SIMULATED PLD VERSUS ACTUAL PLD 
 monthly PLD (R$/MWh) Annual PLD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Ceiling 
price Seaso
qCE 
level ABM Simulation 
PLDnh
FLAT
95% 82 314 216 215 215 116 181 368 370 270 544 212 258,4 
50% 82 314 216 215 215 116 278 368 370 518 544 212 287,2 
0% 156 447 216 215 331 116 278 596 609 766 413 309 370,9 
NAE 
95% 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 489 518 413 212 267,1 
50% 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 368 489 642 674 212 299,1 
0% 82 314 216 215 215 116 278 596 609 766 413 212 335,9 
Fixed 
FLAT
95% 82 488 216 215 215 116 181 254 250 536 550 212 276,1 
50% 243 642 216 215 215 116 181 518 385 403 683 212 335,6 
0% 243 334 216 362 355 116 462 386 385 403 416 345 335,3 
NAE 
95% 82 181 216 215 215 116 181 386 520 403 683 212 284,1 
50% 82 488 216 215 215 116 321 518 520 669 550 212 343,5 
0% 403 181 364 215 215 116 321 386 520 536 683 345 357,1 
Actual data from the current Brazilian market 
PLDnh 375 714 775 758 680 361 570 710 729 766 805 601 653,5 
Figures 1 and 2 provide more insight regarding the hydro’s 
operation. For the Brazilian four largest hydros (in terms of 
installed capacity) with reservoir, during 2014 (the most recent 
year) and for scenario no. 4, these Figures show the best 
strategy chosen to sustain the bilateral contracts (BID1) and to 
seek profit from the leftover energy (BID2). 
 
Figure 1.  qBID1: Sustaining the bilateral contracts (scenario no. 4) 
As can be noticed in Figure 1 (lines are qCEs and dots are 
qBID1s), hydros are able to learn to sustain bilateral contracts. 
This is done by choosing qBID1 as close as possible to qCE. 
Only Tucuruí and Luiz Gonzaga, during some months, cannot 
monthly endure 100% of the bilateral contract by qBID1. This 
happens because Tucuruí and Luiz Gonzaga started the year 
with 44,23% and 42,02% of the reservoir, respectively. 
Additionally, in 2014 water inflows were 11,48% below the 
average of a historical series of 84 years. So, given these 
circumstances, there is nothing that they can do to avoid this. 
 
 
Figure 2.  qBID2: Best strategy to use the leftover energy (scenario no. 4) 
Regarding the second bid, Figure 2 presents a 3D “map” 
where the vertical axe contains the value of each cell of the Q-
learning matrix, and the other axes have the actions and the 
states. So, the top of the “mountains” represents the best 
action to be taken in each month. In Tucuruí and Luiz 
Gonzaga we can note a “mountain range” located at the action 
a1. Action a1 means that the company should offer a qBID2 
and a pBID2 equal to zero, and this action is chosen whenever 
a hydro doesn’t have water to use in BID2. So, these two sets 
of graphics can be seen as complementary to each other. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The entire algorithm combines a goal-oriented scheme 
built through the mentioned linear programming, a goal-
oriented learner from the Q-learning, and Simulated 
Annealing to balance exploring and exploiting the 
reinforcement learning process. The obtained results indicate 
that agents are capable to act on their own in order to seek the 
best strategist to sustain their bilateral contracts and to manage 
their reservoirs aiming at optimizing the leftover energy.  
The obtained results also reveal that monthly PLD greatly 
decrease in comparison with the current real price. Although 
the new PLDs could be equal to the ceiling price, they are, at 
maximum, at 50% this value. This is explained considering 
two elements: competition among hydros to endure bilateral 
contracts and contracting scheme where loads must be fully 
ex-ante contracted. Both elements are linked. The contracting 
scheme pushes hydros to sign contracts and, later on, 
competition in short-term market forces them to bid at lower 
prices to deliver the contracted energy. 
Finally, from a broad perspective, the proposed market 
design maintains the current levels of efficiency and security, 
while increasing the level of flexibility regarding the 
commercial behavior of the agents. In the Brazilian case, this 
flexibility is achieved by replacing the MRE and the 
seasonalization processes by a virtual reservoir model. As a 
consequence, the management of (virtual) reservoirs is under 
the responsibility of each hydro, which could (virtually) save 
water according to their own risk perception. In doing so, the 
operation of the physical system by the ISO is not affected, 
ensuring the efficiency of the hydro cascade operation and 
maintaining the current level of the security of supply. 
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